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Introduction

arbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) is receiving new and intense focus globally, driven by climate
change and potential economic benefits. At an energy
symposium this past December, the Australian Government
announced its $100 million commitment to the Global Carbon
Capture and Storage Institute.1
In so doing, Australia noted
that by 2030, global energy
demand is estimated to rise by
fifty-five percent, with emissions of sixty-two gigatons
(“GT”) globally, thus emphasizing the need for an increase
in CCS efforts worldwide.2
Echoing these sentiments,
a number of research initiatives have begun in the United
States, highlighted by the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships, sponsored by the Department of Energy (“DOE”).3
President Barack Obama has also emphasized the need for
CCS, including in his energy plan the intent to “instruct DOE
to enter into public-private partnerships to develop 5 ‘first-of-akind’ commercial scale coal-fired plants with carbon capture and
sequestration.”4 While this research is identifying effective technologies to make CCS a practical reality, it has not yet broached
the legal and regulatory challenges associated with large-scale
CCS projects to substantively reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions.
That these questions remained unanswered reveals the complicated legal truths regarding CCS—any project must navigate
a complicated web of state and federal property rights issues,
address public safety concerns, and develop risk mitigation
measures to ensure long-term efficacy. Thus far, no one in the
United States has taken the lead to establish a legal and regulatory framework for CCS.
As one of the largest producers of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
emissions in the United States, California is prominently positioned to lead the way in setting CCS precedents on a regional
basis. Given California’s historical position on the vanguard of
environmental issues, it is likely that its involvement in the CCS
discussion will also have a formative effect on establishing the
national legal and regulatory framework necessary for efficient,
effective, and successful geologic CCS (“GCCS”).

Accordingly, this article considers the legal risks inherent
in CCS projects through the lens of California law, focusing
on GCCS.5 Because the law of GCCS is undeveloped, many of
the considerations discussed are directly applicable to assessing
legal risk in other jurisdictions. Ultimately, surveying the many
issues that impact such risk may help eliminate barriers to largescale, commercially viable GCCS
projects that are necessary to
meaningfully reduce GHG emissions, regionally, nationally, and
internationally.
First, the article provides a
brief overview of the mechanics
of GCCS. Then the article identifies and discusses one of the
fundamentals to assessing GCCS
risk—ownership. Next, it analyzes
potential liabilities confronting
any GCCS project in California, drawing on legal principles that
are readily analogous to other jurisdictions. Finally, it proposes
some mechanisms to manage the risks associated with GCCS.

California is prominently
positioned to lead the way
in setting CCS precedents
on a regional basis.
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The Basics of Geologic Carbon Capture
and Sequestration
As the name implies, GCCS involves the capture and
sequestration of CO2 for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.
Simply put, CO2 must first be captured, pre-combustion, postcombustion, or by oxy-firing combustion.6 It then must be stored
permanently (in contrast to enhanced oil recovery (“EOR”), in
which CO2 is not sequestered permanently).
Three basic forms of CCS exist: (1) terrestrial sequestration,
involving trees, grasses, soils, or algae; (2) deep-sea sequestration, involving containment and dissolving in deep oceans; and
(3) geologic CCS. GCCS utilizes underground reservoirs, such
as depleted oil and gas fields, saline aquifers, and un-mineable
coal seams. Research efforts thus far show that GCCS in saline
formations has the greatest near-term potential to reduce GHG
emissions, although the legal and regulatory challenges are
*Les Lo Baugh (llobaugh@fulbright.com) is the head of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.’s West Coast Environmental Practice Group, based in Los Angeles. He
advises clients on energy, environmental, and corporate matters. **William L.
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great.7 However, geologic sequestration is not new. Millions of
tons of CO2 are injected each year. Projects such as Statoil at
Sleipner, BP at In Salah, and the EnCana EOR project have been
operating for years.
The process of GCCS begins with capturing CO2 from fossilfuel power plants, cement plants, petroleum refineries, etc.8 The
gas stream is then scrubbed, resulting in virtually pure CO2.9 It
is then compressed and cooled to
a supercritical state, during which
it exhibits characteristics of both
liquid and gas.10 Once supercritical, the CO2 is transported to the
injection site by truck (pipelines
are expected once commercial
projects get started).11
Once at the injection site,
the captured, purified, and compressed CO2 is injected through
wells into “pore space” deep
below the surface of one or more
cap rock formations.12 Pore space
consists of porous sedimentary
rock layers, formed from sand,
mud, or ancient shells, that allow
the passage of fluids.13 Sedimentary rock occurs in layers, flanked
by other layers of impermeable rock, such as mudstone and
clay.14 These impermeable layers trap water, oil, and gas beneath
and between them.15 Depths of between 3,000 and 15,000 feet
are generally considered ideal for GCCS because pore space
at that depth is often comprised of saline aquifers, containing
ancient, trapped saltwater with high levels of dissolved solids.16
The water in these deep saline reservoirs is considered commercially “useless” because of its depth and contamination.17 In
deep saline formations, it is theorized that supercritical CO2 will
flow as a distinct liquid on top, displacing and compressing the
saline water below it.18 When injection ceases, scientific models predict that the CO2 will remain hydro-dynamically trapped
at the top of the aquifer by the cap rock or other impermeable
layer, remaining in place for thousands of years.19
Estimates put the geologic storage capacity in saline formations in the United States at a vast 3,300 to 12,000 billion metric
tons.20 In California alone, DOE estimates the storage space in
deep saline formations to be between 76 and 303 billion metric
tons.21 To put this in perspective, California emits an estimated
104 million metric tons of CO2 per year.22 Thus, the potential impact on reducing these emissions into the atmosphere is
great—but not without legal challenges.

as to the ownership of pore space.24 This issue is slowly being
addressed at the state level, as Wyoming, Texas, and Illinois
have recently enacted statutory provisions regarding pore space
and liability, but only for specific CCS purposes.25 The application of the concept of the “negative rule of capture,” and its
associated statutory provisions, are also untested in the GCCS
context.26
In California, the surface
owner generally owns the
rights to property below the
surface, “to the center of the
earth, and above the surface
to the heavens.”27 Thus, if the
surface and subsurface rights
have not been severed, the pore
space should remain with the
surface owner. However, circumstances exist in which the
perceived public interest is substantial and the potential property use is limited by practical
considerations. For instance,
airplanes enter airspace above
property at a safe altitude without it constituting a trespass.
Access to navigable water
and shorelines is treated similarly. As such, the public interest
aspects of GCCS may affect ownership as GCCS becomes a
more integral part of climate change solutions.
Similarly, the issue of ownership of pore space for CCS
purposes has not been determined by either legislative action
or express judicial decisions. The recent report and model rules
released by the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission, as
well as numerous statements by various parties, including California state entities, have taken the position that the ownership
of such pore space, particularly in saline formations as opposed
to hydrocarbon formations, is undetermined.28
While no California court has explicitly vested pore space
ownership in the surface owner of a severed estate for CCS purposes, absent legislative action or “judicial activism,” it appears
that the better argument is that pore space ownership resides
with the surface owner and generally remains so even if mineral
rights are severed. A surface owner who has conveyed its mineral rights and severed the estate,
own[s] nearly all rights in the land except for the exclusive right to drill for and produce oil, gas and other
hydrocarbons. The owners of the mineral estate . . .
typically hold only the very limited right . . . to drill
and capture subsurface oil and gas, and the incidental
rights necessary to accomplish this. Thus . . . the lessee generally obtains only a nonpossessory interest in
real property to capture such substances, which is in the
nature of an easement.29
Accordingly, absent express language in the mineral grant,
pore space ownership “should” likely remain with the surface

Because of the
long-term nature of GCCS,
ownership issues
regarding real property
interests and long-term
liability are critical
and unique, centered on
the question of pore space.

GCCS Ownership Issues
Because of the long-term nature of GCCS, ownership issues
regarding real property interests and long-term liability are critical and unique, centered on the question of pore space.23 In many
regions, the law of ownership regarding subsurface mineral and
water rights is well developed. However, no clear answers exist
17
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owner despite severance; however, the wording of the operative agreements must be evaluated to determine whether or not
a broader conveyance occurred than is typical. This conclusion
is supported by a number of cases in other jurisdictions addressing ownership of storage space for natural gas.30 Gas storage
cases in Texas, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Michigan have all stated that the surface owner, and not a mineral
rights holder, retains ownership of pore space.31 Nonetheless,
even assuming a court of first instance applied the above logic
to GCCS, a risk of tort liability remains on severed estates if the
mineral rights are not also acquired prior to injection, as migrating or escaping CO2 could allegedly interfere with the mineral
rights, as discussed below.

Risks of Ownership and Operation of a
CCS Project in California
The focus of the experimental and pilot GCCS projects is
the validation of the scientific models. While awaiting this validation, however, various risks must be evaluated. The first concern for a developer, for obvious reasons, is what happens if it
is alleged that injected CO2 does not remain sequestered in the
manner expected. At the same time, a number of non-release
legal risks also exist, even if captured CO2 behaves as theorized.
Whatever the cause, a GCCS project may encounter tort, nuisance, negligence, and/or strict liability claims. The more litigious the culture of the jurisdiction, the more likely such issues
will be raised even in circumstances where GCCS performs to
optimal expectations.

Liability from Release Events
In most circumstances, these liabilities will likely result if
there is unexpected behavior of captured CO2, such as migration offsite from the saline injection reservoir into a linked adjacent subsurface saline reservoir, where the pore space is located
within a larger saline reservoir that extends to other estates.
Theoretically, in some circumstances, CO2 could also migrate
through new faults or fractures into an unlinked adjacent subsurface saline reservoir; an adjacent hydrocarbon or mineral formation; groundwater; other adjacent subsurface strata; or onto the
surface itself.32
If a GCCS site was not selected properly, theoretically,
captured CO2 might also react unexpectedly in the designated
property, leading to potential liability if all surface and subsurface rights for the injection area had not been acquired. In those
circumstances, CO2 might migrate into other unacquired saline,
hydrocarbon, or other mineral formations under the designated
property. CO2 might also migrate into other subsurface strata or
groundwater stores under the designated property, or onto the
unacquired surface at or near the injection point.33
While all of these possibilities might result in allegations
of liability, the area of greatest concern would likely be from
allegations of migration into hydrocarbon or other mineral formations, groundwater,34 and onto the surface,35 rather than from
migration within the deep saline aquifer under adjacent property.
This is due to the likely absence of any provable legal damages
resulting from a theoretical CO2 migration, as discussed below.
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If a release of CO2 from the injection reservoir did occur for
whatever reason, this could theoretically expose a GCCS project
to allegations for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability for operation of an ultrahazardous activity. While no California court has addressed these issues for GCCS, analogues exist
within other subject areas, as well as in other jurisdictions.

Trespass
Trespass is the “‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of
another,” regardless of motive.36 A trespass may be permanent
or continuing, with a continuing trespass constituting a series of
separate injuries that can be discontinued or abated.37 The classification as one or the other impacts statute of limitations issues,
as well as potential damages amounts.38
While no California court has addressed subsurface trespass
in the GCCS context, when injecting waste fluids, “causing subsurface migration of fluids into a mineral estate without consent
constitutes a trespass.”39 However, courts may not hold CO2
injection directly analogous to waste fluid injection, and migration into a saline aquifer may not be treated the same as a migration into a mineral estate. More importantly, as discussed below,
because deep saline aquifers have no value for mineral extraction or groundwater use, courts may find no damages.
In the event damages are found, the general measure is that
“which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby whether it could have been anticipated or not.”40 If a trespass is permanent, all past and future damages are recoverable
in one action.41 In instances of trespass for subsurface migration of fluids into a mineral estate, a normal measure of damages
for trespass is the reasonable rental value of the property during
the course of the trespass.42 However, courts have flexibility and
award the deterioration in the market value of the mineral estate,
the costs of disposing of the substances causing the trespass, and
the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the injector.43

Nuisance
Under California law, a nuisance is an interference with the
use and enjoyment of a property right.44 This interference must
constitute unreasonable conduct that causes substantial harm.45
As with trespass, a nuisance can be permanent or continuing.46
If a nuisance is permanent, a party may only bring one action to
recover all damages, including anticipated future damages.47
A plaintiff may seek either injunctive relief or damages in
connection with a nuisance.48 The measure of damages, like
those for trespass, is “the amount which will compensate for all
the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have
been anticipated or not.”49 A plaintiff may recover damages for
annoyance, discomfort, inconvenience, and mental suffering,
even absent physical damage.50 If a nuisance is intentional, a
court may award punitive or exemplary damages.51 Damages
may also consider diminution of the property value.52 If a nuisance is continuing and can be abated, a plaintiff may seek an
injunction and damages accruing prior to the abatement. If the
nuisance continues, a plaintiff may bring successive actions for
additional damages, so long as any prior award of damages did
not include anticipated future damages.53
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Negligence
A party is liable in California for negligence for injuries
caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care given the circumstances.54 Damages can be compensatory to “[restore] the
plaintiff as nearly as possible to his or her former position,
or [give] some pecuniary equivalent,” as well as punitive.55
Although the reasonable care standard is not judicially developed, it is expected that a court will consider the public benefit
of sequestration in imposing a duty, in addition to the traditional
negligence considerations of foreseeability, extent of harm, and
causation.56 This consideration will analyze the consequences to
the public of the imposed duty, as well as the social utility of the
activity.57 The public policy aspects of CCS are in an evolutionary stage.

Strict Liability
Under California law, strict liability is imposed for ultrahazardous activities (“UHA”), defined as “certain activities [that]
create such a serious risk of danger that it is justifiable to place
liability for the loss on the person engaging in them, regardless
of lack of culpability.”58 Classification of UHAs differs from
nuisance activities because UHAs are lawful and cannot be abated.59 Strict liability for UHAs is limited only to harm within the
scope of the abnormal risk created, and applies only to the class
of persons exposed to the abnormal risk.60
Because of these factors, a court must individually analyze
the factual scenario for a claim to determine if the “risk created
is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the
circumstances . . . as to justify the imposition of strict liability
from the harm that results . . . even though it is carried on with
all reasonable care.”61 Because strict liability is a theory of tort
recovery, compensatory and punitive damages are the appropriate remedies, as applicable.62
Thus, the question of GCCS as a UHA is unique to each
project. GCCS by its nature does not appear to pose an abnormal
risk. However, as is commonly said, “bad facts make bad law.”
If unfortunate circumstances occurred, potential exists for the
law to evolve in an unanticipated manner.

Select Considerations Impacting Liability
Released CO2 : The Question of Damages
Although unexpected migration of CO2 may technically
constitute a tort, an open question exists as to proving damages.
While no California court has directly addressed damages in
CO2 sequestration, courts have decided the issue in the context
of subsurface injection of fluids, which has analogues in oil,
gas, and hazardous waste injection case law, both in California
and in other jurisdictions. Accordingly, if no identifiable damage exists, a claim for unauthorized subsurface migration may
fail. In the controlling California case on subsurface migration,
Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of California, injected waste water
ultimately migrated into plaintiff’s mineral estate, resulting in
“widespread damage throughout a large oil, gas and mineral
field.”63 Because this injection interfered with plaintiff’s right
to extract commodities, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
19

court’s award of rental value for the trespass—the market price
for the cost of wastewater injection.64
If courts adopt this reasoning, which seems most appropriate, no damages should exist absent interference with another’s
mineral rights. Given that GCCS injects CO2 into deep saline
reservoirs, presumed to be devoid of any extractable minerals of
value, the resulting encroachment within the saline reservoir on
an adjoining estate should fail for lack of damages. Similarly, if
the injected CO2 migrates into unacquired strata on the acquired
property containing no commodities, no damage should result.
These conclusions are consistent with the Ohio case Chance
v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,65 which establishes the precedent oft cited
by GCCS prognosticators that no damage exists for subsurface
migration of materials into adjacent landowners property absent
a reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface by the adjacent landowner.66

GCCS Permitting Probably Will Not Yield a Permit
Shield Defense
Currently, the injection of CO2 will require a permit under
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water
Act (“SDWA”).67 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) has recently proposed a new class of well under SDWA
(Class VI) and minimum technical criteria for injection of
CO2.68 This new permit would require adherence to a number
of regulations aimed at preventing CO2-related contamination of
underground drinking water.69 This begs the question of whether
permitting of GCCS projects will protect an operator from
liability in the event of a release with a “permit shield.” 70 An
examination of SDWA reveals that operators should expect no
such defense, as SDWA does not contain the required specific
language providing for a permit shield defense. Even if such a
defense was clearly articulated in the statute, courts generally
interpret permit shields to protect a permittee only from civil
and criminal penalties assessed through a citizen suit or government action, and not common law claims such as trespass and
nuisance.71

Liabilities for Non-Release Events
Unlike the risks of release of CO2, these liabilities represent
possible costs to a GCCS project before initiation and/or even if
captured CO2 remains sequestered as expected.

Environmental Permitting Challenges
In efforts to obtain appropriate permits and regulatory clearance on the state and federal level, a GCCS project may face
significant and costly litigation before getting off of the ground.
These costs most likely will come by way of challenges to permits required for compliance with SDWA and the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) on the federal level, the
California Environmental Quality Action (“CEQA”) on the state
level, and other local regulations.
It is difficult to predict the form of a challenge to a GCCS
project’s SDWA permitting, as EPA issued proposed rules for
GCCS that have not yet been finalized (discussed above). In the
interim, a challenge to a GCCS permit could come pursuant to
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

a formal EPA guidance document issued to EPA staff and all
EPA Regions covering issuance of permits for geologic sequestration under the existing SDWA regulations for underground
injection.72 While it is arguable that noncompliance with such a
document could support some action by EPA, it is unlikely that
a private party could avail itself of noncompliance with the guidance documents.73
The more likely challenge to a CO2 injection permit would
come directly from NEPA claims in federal court and CEQA
claims in state court. This is a particularly perilous aspect of the
process, as the analysis of the environmental impact of the injection plan will come under public scrutiny for the first time when
the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), under NEPA,
or the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”), under CEQA, is
prepared. Given the developing
nature of GCCS, a project may
be particularly vulnerable, especially in litigious jurisdictions,
during the EIS/EIR process in the
event that a litigious private party
or environmental group desires to
slow or prevent the development
of GCCS technology and projects.74 These costs and/or delays
are certainly possible even if an
operator meticulously adheres to
NEPA or CEQA requirements, such as the adequate discussion
of alternatives and cumulative impacts, and avoidance of project
segmentation.
Similarly, it is not unusual for the construction of a well
to require a permit pursuant to county or city ordinances. For
instance, under the Police Powers provisions of the California
State Constitution and in other jurisdictions, local agencies may
require permit conditions that have a reasonable relationship to
the purpose of the permit.75 Thus, methods of construction, as
long as they are consistent with the requirements of the State
Department of Gas, Oil & Geothermal Resources, may be part
of the local permit. A challenge to these permits would also
likely come under CEQA.

California is subject to notable seismic activities and no nexus
need be proven before litigation is commenced. While the frequency of seismic activity in California could provide opportunities for plaintiffs to allege a nexus between GCCS activities
and any specific seismicity, the historic background of recurrent
seismic activity in California may make it difficult for a plaintiff
to establish causation. If litigated, the general concepts of tort
liability discussed above would apply.

Looking Forward: The Need for Certainty
At a minimum, this survey of California law shows that
given the unknowns, the question of litigation over a project is
one of “when” and “on what grounds.” However, many potential GCCS operators may not view themselves as pioneers.
While prudent contracting and
operations, along with adequate
insurance, typically reduce risk
exposure, the long time horizon
of sequestration poses unique
liabilities and responsibilities
that industry and current legal
systems appear ill-equipped to
address. But the chorus of government, industry, and environmental voices emphasizing
GCCS as a climate change solution seems to argue that allowing a protracted period for courts
to the develop the applicable law is inconsistent with the public
interest. Notably, the recently proposed Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act, which contains the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act, began forcing these issues by providing GCCS
tax incentives and requiring the Secretary of the Treasury, in
conjunction with EPA, to establish regulations setting security
measures to ensure CO2 remains sequestered.77 This first step
hopefully will evolve into a substantial and expeditious resolution of these issues. Nevertheless, a number of precedents
may provide a conceptual basis to address the unique issues of
sequestration including post-operational issues.
Programs like the Acute Orphan Well Account, the Hazardous and Idle-Deserted Well Abatement Fund, and the Methane Gas Hazards Reduction Assistance programs may prove as
stepping stones to addressing GCCS liability over the expected
timeline, but they do not provide a shared solution when the
injector, operator, or owner of the stored substance is financially
viable.78 These programs also only involve discovery of releases
during the operational life of a project. Further, they do not cut
off an operator’s liability after well closure.
Other precedents may serve as more useful models, including the Price Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and
the National Flood Insurance Program. The former is similar to
an industry liability pooling plan.79 On the other hand, the latter
guarantees insurance to at-risk communities.80 Similarly, many
GCCS commentators have called for government assumption of
monitoring and liability after a reasonable time, such as 10 years
following the end of injections.81

A GCCS project may
encounter tort, nuisance,
negligence, and/or strict
liability claims.

Geologic Sequestration and Injection Versus
Allegedly Induced Seismic Activity
A number of reported instances of seismic activity induced
by large scale human activities exist, such as underground
nuclear explosions and construction projects.76 Allegations of
geothermal plant activity resulting in seismic activity during
the 1990s in California did not apparently result in any financial awards to potential plaintiffs. In addition, in the 1960s some
believed injected waste fluid triggered seismic activity in the
Rocky Mountains, although this was not substantiated. However, this should not be viewed as a shield to such allegations
in the future.
Although the depth of the target saline aquifer is generally
substantially below the level of any seismic activity associated
with the circumstances above, litigation risk exists because
Winter 2009
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Another important matter for consideration is granting
operators some form of eminent domain, similar to grants by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or state public utility
commissions for gas pipelines.82 This would presumably require
new federal or state legislation, but would greatly reduce liability risks, project costs, and expedite development of GCCS
(the lack of such power when it comes to alternative energy
power lines is an analogous failure of the legal system to adapt
to changing needs). Of course, much of the concern would dissipate if the migration of CO2 is treated similarly to the state’s
basis for water regulation and air traffic—that is, absent some
reasonable expectation of use or actual damage, no claim lies for
a property owner.

Conclusion
In light of the enormous potential for GCCS to be a useful
tool in the battle against climate change, thoughtful but expeditious resolution of these issues is clearly in the public interest,
both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, legislative
gridlock and political partisanship have too often been part of
recent legislative processes. However, the generally accepted
need to aggressively address the continued massive infusion of
CO2 into our atmosphere should provide focus and incentives to
our leaders. Given the need to address GCCS and its associated
legal obstacles, one can only hope lawmakers move faster than
hydro-dynamically trapped CO2.
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5

See Black, supra note 2.

6

11

European Union @ United Nations, UN Climate Change Conference:
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